The Centrality Of A Paramilitary In The Present Slide To War in Sri Lanka
Daily Mirror, Sri Lanka
Opinion
April 25, 2006
Jehan Perera
The peace process, as it has evolved since 2002, is near its terminus point. The end stage began during the Presidential election of 2005. During the election campaign, President Mahinda Rajapaksa and his nationalist allies sought to distance themselves from the fundamentals of the existing peace process. They spoke about getting rid of the Norwegian facilitators and about a new ceasefire agreement that would rep
lace the existing one. Upon winning the presidency, however, the government adopted a more reasonable approach to the peace process. But it is evident that the change of heart is not complete.
The inability of the Norwegian special envoy to the peace process, Jon Hanssen Bauer to obtain a second meeting with the LTTE’s political wing leader S P Thamilselvan was the latest blow to the peace process. Mr Hanssen Bauer had taken a revised proposal of the government for the consideration of the LTTE. The LTTE’s snub was perhaps more directed to the government than to the Norwegian special envoy. However, his inability to meet with either President Mahinda Rajapaksa or with LTTE leader Velupillai Pirapaharan was an even worse setback. It demonstrates a lack of commitment on the part of these two leaders to do everything in their power to avert a human and national catastrophe.
While the top leaders of the government and LTTE strived to show that they were above the fray, at the ground level an unsustainable situation has arisen. There are multiple incidents of violence being reported from the north east that could soon lead to full scale fighting. Most of those who are dying are government soldiers who are being ambushed on a regular basis.
The latest development is the killing of Sinhalese civilians. The justification that the LTTE would be seeking to give is that any retaliation against Tamil civilians will be met with their own reprisal killings. There have been incidents of mob violence and military retaliation against Tamil civilians after LTTE attacks against the Sri Lankan military and homeguards.
Looming large in the disaster that is befalling the country is one of the LTTE’s former commanders, Colonel Karuna Amman. Only now are the fearful repercussions of the great split that occurred within the LTTE in March 2004 becoming apparent. When the split occurred it seemed to herald a major weakening of the LTTE. Karuna challenged the two most important claims of the LTTE, that it was the sole representative of the Tamil people, and that the north and east were one. Claiming that he had 6000 cadre backing him, Karuna claimed the east for his group. At that time there were scenes of open public support for Karuna in the east.
Karuna’s revival
In the months that followed, however, the eastern rebellion seemed to fade away and the LTTE seemed to have re-established the status quo. The LTTE warned the government that the Karuna split was an internal one that they would deal with and they would brook no interference. The breakaway Karuna group sought to invoke the safeguards of the Ceasefire Agreement to preserve themselves and be an entity separate from the LTTE. But neither the government nor Norwegian facilitators stepped into secure a negotiated settlement between the LTTE and its rebel faction in terms of the Ceasefire Agreement. An LTTE military attack outside of the limits established by the Ceasefire Agreement saw top Karuna cadres killed, in the east and in safehouses in Colombo.
But throughout the past two years the Karuna group has been active in the east, and now it is said to be strong as well. Independent sources report that hundreds of Karuna cadres are present in the Batticaloa district and a few hundred are also present in the Trincomalee district. The LTTE’s dilemma is that the longer they wait, the stronger the Karuna group is likely to get, both militarily and politically. Earlier this month they opened a political office in Batticaloa.
The LTTE’s interest would be to eliminate the Karuna group as a military and political force as soon as possible. Unlike in April 2004, however, it is not possible for the LTTE to launch a military offensive against the Karuna group. They are no longer protecting territory as they are in the government-controlled areas and operate as a guerilla force from there.
Therefore, for the LTTE to eliminate the Karuna group they need to get the government to perform this task. Or else they need to get the Ceasefire Agreement abrogated so that they can engage in hot pursuit within government-controlled areas.
At the first round of Geneva talks in February, the LTTE made no secret that their sole concern was to have the government disarm and eliminate the Karuna group. But unfortunately, the discussions on the Karuna group at the Geneva talks were not based on truth but on falsehood. The LTTE insisted that the government was providing assistance to the Karuna group, which the government denied.
Acknowledge truth
Tragically, there is a growing impression that those at the highest levels of the government are preparing themselves for an inevitable war.
Certainly the LTTE is giving them every reason for resorting to war. But the sufferings of war will be immense to the people who will be its first victims. Even now it is the poor villagers of the north east who are suffering the brunt of the undeclared war that is expanding its tentacles. The moment that large numbers of people become the victims of war, they will withdraw their support to the leaders who led them into war. Obviously the government will be more vulnerable on this score as it has to face elections sooner or later, unlike the LTTE.
A wise political leadership would do everything in its power to avoid a war, whether it takes the form of a high intensity or low intensity war. This does not mean destroying the Karuna group or acceding to the LTTE’s agenda. The break up of the LTTE in March 2004 and the existence of an eastern Tamil identity are realities that the government has no reason to try and reverse.
So far the LTTE has sought to ignore the existence of the Karuna group as an autonomous entity, and instead refers to them as paramilitaries who are creatures of the Sri Lankan military. But the LTTE cannot reasonably expect the government to join it in suppressing this eastern Tamil identity and the group that stands for it, merely because this is disadvantageous to the LTTE and to its cause.
On the other hand, the government needs to stop denying its relationship with the Karuna group.
The international monitors and other independent observers have pointed to the existence of Karuna group camps in government-controlled areas. They have also seen Karuna cadre in uniform and with arms in close proximity to military camps. The government needs to consider formalising its relationship with the Karuna group, perhaps by entering into a bilateral agreement with them that outlaws the use of force, just as the Ceasefire Agreement with the LTTE does. These are realities that the government should be prepared to discuss with the LTTE instead of denying them.
But the main question today is whether the peace process as it has existed can survive. The lack of commitment of the government and LTTE leaderships to the peace process is manifest in their reluctance to meet with the Norwegian special envoy.
The peace process that commenced in 2002 was based on the primacy of the government and LTTE, with the Norwegian facilitators playing a subordinate role of acting at their behest, and not doing anything that they did not approve. This system can only work on the basis of the genuine will and commitment of the government and LTTE to compromise with each other and reach a settlement. This system is no longer working because the basic premise of mutual commitment is lacking.
Therefore, the likely scenario at the present time is a period of war before a new Ceasefire Agreement or new peace process can be obtained. Or there needs to be a change of heart, prior to the tragedy of war.
A new peace process would require the inclusion of more parties, including the Muslims and also the Karuna group, and the elevation of the facilitator to the status of a mediator and even arbitrator. This requires a change of heart or of ground realities. Let us hope it is a change of heart.
Opinion
April 25, 2006
Jehan Perera
The peace process, as it has evolved since 2002, is near its terminus point. The end stage began during the Presidential election of 2005. During the election campaign, President Mahinda Rajapaksa and his nationalist allies sought to distance themselves from the fundamentals of the existing peace process. They spoke about getting rid of the Norwegian facilitators and about a new ceasefire agreement that would rep
lace the existing one. Upon winning the presidency, however, the government adopted a more reasonable approach to the peace process. But it is evident that the change of heart is not complete.The inability of the Norwegian special envoy to the peace process, Jon Hanssen Bauer to obtain a second meeting with the LTTE’s political wing leader S P Thamilselvan was the latest blow to the peace process. Mr Hanssen Bauer had taken a revised proposal of the government for the consideration of the LTTE. The LTTE’s snub was perhaps more directed to the government than to the Norwegian special envoy. However, his inability to meet with either President Mahinda Rajapaksa or with LTTE leader Velupillai Pirapaharan was an even worse setback. It demonstrates a lack of commitment on the part of these two leaders to do everything in their power to avert a human and national catastrophe.
While the top leaders of the government and LTTE strived to show that they were above the fray, at the ground level an unsustainable situation has arisen. There are multiple incidents of violence being reported from the north east that could soon lead to full scale fighting. Most of those who are dying are government soldiers who are being ambushed on a regular basis.
The latest development is the killing of Sinhalese civilians. The justification that the LTTE would be seeking to give is that any retaliation against Tamil civilians will be met with their own reprisal killings. There have been incidents of mob violence and military retaliation against Tamil civilians after LTTE attacks against the Sri Lankan military and homeguards.
Looming large in the disaster that is befalling the country is one of the LTTE’s former commanders, Colonel Karuna Amman. Only now are the fearful repercussions of the great split that occurred within the LTTE in March 2004 becoming apparent. When the split occurred it seemed to herald a major weakening of the LTTE. Karuna challenged the two most important claims of the LTTE, that it was the sole representative of the Tamil people, and that the north and east were one. Claiming that he had 6000 cadre backing him, Karuna claimed the east for his group. At that time there were scenes of open public support for Karuna in the east.
Karuna’s revival
In the months that followed, however, the eastern rebellion seemed to fade away and the LTTE seemed to have re-established the status quo. The LTTE warned the government that the Karuna split was an internal one that they would deal with and they would brook no interference. The breakaway Karuna group sought to invoke the safeguards of the Ceasefire Agreement to preserve themselves and be an entity separate from the LTTE. But neither the government nor Norwegian facilitators stepped into secure a negotiated settlement between the LTTE and its rebel faction in terms of the Ceasefire Agreement. An LTTE military attack outside of the limits established by the Ceasefire Agreement saw top Karuna cadres killed, in the east and in safehouses in Colombo.
But throughout the past two years the Karuna group has been active in the east, and now it is said to be strong as well. Independent sources report that hundreds of Karuna cadres are present in the Batticaloa district and a few hundred are also present in the Trincomalee district. The LTTE’s dilemma is that the longer they wait, the stronger the Karuna group is likely to get, both militarily and politically. Earlier this month they opened a political office in Batticaloa.
The LTTE’s interest would be to eliminate the Karuna group as a military and political force as soon as possible. Unlike in April 2004, however, it is not possible for the LTTE to launch a military offensive against the Karuna group. They are no longer protecting territory as they are in the government-controlled areas and operate as a guerilla force from there.
Therefore, for the LTTE to eliminate the Karuna group they need to get the government to perform this task. Or else they need to get the Ceasefire Agreement abrogated so that they can engage in hot pursuit within government-controlled areas.
At the first round of Geneva talks in February, the LTTE made no secret that their sole concern was to have the government disarm and eliminate the Karuna group. But unfortunately, the discussions on the Karuna group at the Geneva talks were not based on truth but on falsehood. The LTTE insisted that the government was providing assistance to the Karuna group, which the government denied.
Acknowledge truth
Tragically, there is a growing impression that those at the highest levels of the government are preparing themselves for an inevitable war.
Certainly the LTTE is giving them every reason for resorting to war. But the sufferings of war will be immense to the people who will be its first victims. Even now it is the poor villagers of the north east who are suffering the brunt of the undeclared war that is expanding its tentacles. The moment that large numbers of people become the victims of war, they will withdraw their support to the leaders who led them into war. Obviously the government will be more vulnerable on this score as it has to face elections sooner or later, unlike the LTTE.
A wise political leadership would do everything in its power to avoid a war, whether it takes the form of a high intensity or low intensity war. This does not mean destroying the Karuna group or acceding to the LTTE’s agenda. The break up of the LTTE in March 2004 and the existence of an eastern Tamil identity are realities that the government has no reason to try and reverse.
So far the LTTE has sought to ignore the existence of the Karuna group as an autonomous entity, and instead refers to them as paramilitaries who are creatures of the Sri Lankan military. But the LTTE cannot reasonably expect the government to join it in suppressing this eastern Tamil identity and the group that stands for it, merely because this is disadvantageous to the LTTE and to its cause.
On the other hand, the government needs to stop denying its relationship with the Karuna group.
The international monitors and other independent observers have pointed to the existence of Karuna group camps in government-controlled areas. They have also seen Karuna cadre in uniform and with arms in close proximity to military camps. The government needs to consider formalising its relationship with the Karuna group, perhaps by entering into a bilateral agreement with them that outlaws the use of force, just as the Ceasefire Agreement with the LTTE does. These are realities that the government should be prepared to discuss with the LTTE instead of denying them.
But the main question today is whether the peace process as it has existed can survive. The lack of commitment of the government and LTTE leaderships to the peace process is manifest in their reluctance to meet with the Norwegian special envoy.
The peace process that commenced in 2002 was based on the primacy of the government and LTTE, with the Norwegian facilitators playing a subordinate role of acting at their behest, and not doing anything that they did not approve. This system can only work on the basis of the genuine will and commitment of the government and LTTE to compromise with each other and reach a settlement. This system is no longer working because the basic premise of mutual commitment is lacking.
Therefore, the likely scenario at the present time is a period of war before a new Ceasefire Agreement or new peace process can be obtained. Or there needs to be a change of heart, prior to the tragedy of war.
A new peace process would require the inclusion of more parties, including the Muslims and also the Karuna group, and the elevation of the facilitator to the status of a mediator and even arbitrator. This requires a change of heart or of ground realities. Let us hope it is a change of heart.
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